Air-Surface
Teamwork
By mid-summer 1951, the siege ships assigned to Task Group
95.2 in Wonsan harbor for thirty-day periods had learned
to whet air-surface teamwork and coordination to a razor
sharpness. Task Force 77 periodically assigned aircraft
to the bombarding vessels for spotting duty in order to
increase the effectiveness of the naval gunfire. The ships
themselves sent shore fire control parties to Hwangto-do,
Mo-do or Tae-do islands to assist the naval gunfire liaison
parties spot the ships gunfire.
The
alacrity and effectiveness of the teamwork developed between
naval ships shore fire control parties, and planes illustrated
by an- event recorded by CDR H G Claudius, commanding officer
of the USS Floyd B. Parks, during September 1951.
"We
had a shore fire control party (Ensign John Thorson in charge)
from the ship on Hwangto-do who spotted for us during the
day and sometimes at night. One afternoon we had two Task
Force 77 planes spotting our bombardment on Kalma Gak. At
the same time, two of our AMS-type minesweeps in formation
were sweeping just off the south beach of the harbor. We
received a hurry-up call from our shore fire control party
on Hwangto-do that they could see the Reds were working
two guns out from caves to open up on the minesweeps, who
were probably only about 4,000 yards from the gun positions.
We immediately vectored the two TF 77 planes, who still
had rockets, to the enemy guns. All in a couple of minutes,
and before the enemy guns could get off a shot at the mine-sweepers
or return to the cover of their caves, the planes had been
vectored in to where they could see the guns and plaster
them with a full load of rockets. Through the alertness
and instant action of the shore fire control party, the
ship's CIC and gunnery team, and the TF 77 pilots, our minesweepers
were probably saved from casualties and damage and two enemy
guns were damaged or destroyed.
Still the most important and hazardous island was Hwangto-do.
Assigned to this island was a U.S. Marine Officer and three
spotters, plus a contingent (12) of Korean Marines to protect
the island from nocturnal sampan raids. As at Mo-do and
Tae-do, the duty was four months in duration.
Life
on Hwangto-do was a cave existence of C-rations, noise,
and darkness.. The occupants could come outside only at
night. A light or a fire at night drew heavy mortar fire.
Daylight meant constant danger from mortar and machine gun
as well as artillery fire. The shore fire control parties
dug bunkers on the north side of the island, where they
lived, and a lookout bunkers on the top of the island for
observation purposes.
The island was without water, except for one small well.
Additional water, food, ammunition, and supplies had to
be brought in at night across a small landing beach which
faced Wonsan.
On clear nights, the enemy was visible from the Hwangto-do
observation post. The number of trucks whose headlights
could be counted averaged 800. On occasions, the south-ward-moving
truck count rose as high as 700. For every truck in convoy
whose headlights could be seen, three or four without headlights
could not be seen. Whenever the track count out of Wonsan
was, above normal, increased activity along the battlefront
could be expected a few days later.
The
senior naval officer ashore on the harbor islands was the
intelligence officer of Commander Task Group 95.2, a destroyer
or destroyer escort squadron commander, who was afloat
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USS
Titania (AKA-13) In Wonsan Harbor, North Korea,
circa 10-13 September 1951, seen from USS Floyd
B. Parks (DD-884), which is coming alongside to
take on fuel. Photographed by AFAN E.A. McDade.
Official
U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of
the U.S. National Archives.
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"The
Fightin' Floyd B"
