The
ships themselves sent shore fire control parties to Hwangto-do,
Mo-do or Tae-do islands to assist the naval gunfire liaison
parties spot the ships' gunfire.
Still
the most important and hazardous island was Hwangto-do.
Assigned to this island were the U.S. Marine Officer and
three spotters, plus an contingent of Korean Marines to
protect the island from nocturnal sampan raids.
Life on Hwangto-do was a cave existence of C-rations, noise
and darkness. The occupants could come outside only at night.
A light or a fire at might drew heavy mortar fire. Daylight
meant constant danger from mortar and machine gun as well
as artillery fire. The shore fire control parties dug bunkers
on north side of the island, where they lived, and a lookout
bunker on top of the island for observation purposes. The
island was without water, except for one small well. Additional
water, food. ammunition, and supplies had to be brought
in at night across a small landing beach which faced Wonsan.
On clear nights, the enemy truck traffic moving south from
Wonsan was visible from the Hwangto-do observation post.
The number of trucks whose headlights could be counted averaged
300. On occasions. the southward-moving truck count rose
as high as. 700. For every truck in convoy whose headlights
could be seen, three or four without headlights could not
be seen. Whenever the truck count out of Wonsan was above
normal, increased activity along the battlefront could be
expected a few days later. The senior naval officer ashore
on the harbor islands was the intelligence officer of commander
Task Group 952.
The alacrity and effectiveness of the teamwork developed
between naval ships, shore fire control parties, and planes
is illustrated by an event recorded by CDR H. G. Claudius,
commanding officer of the USS Floyd B. Parks, during September
1951:
"We
had a shore fire control party from the ship on Hwangto-do
who spotted for us during the day and sometimes at night.
One afternoon we had two Task Force 77 planes spotting our
bombardment on Kalma Gak.
At the same time our AMS-type minesweeps in formation were
sweeping just off the south beach of the harbor. We received
a hurry-up call from our shore fire control party on Hwangto-do
that they could see the Reds were working two guns out from
caves to open up on the minesweeps, who were probably only
about 4,000 yards from the gun positions. We immediately
vectored the two TF 77 planes, who still had rockets, to
the enemy guns. All in a couple of minutes, and before the
before the enemy guns could get off a shot at the minesweepers
or return to the cover of their caves, the planes had been
vectored in to where they could see the guns and plaster
them with a full load of rockets. Through the alertness
and instant action of the shore fire control party, the
ship's CIC and gunnery team, and the TF77 pilots, our minesweepers
were probably saved from casualties and damage and two enemy
guns were damaged or destroyed."
The island of Hwangto-do was successfully raided by Communist
sampans on the night 28-29 November 1951. All of the ten
houses were burned by the raiders, seven Korean Marines
and one civilian killed and five civilians captured.
next page
"The
Fightin' Floyd B"
